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ABSTRACT
Using a matched employer-employee data set of manufacturing plants in three sub-Saharan
countries, I compare the marginal productivity of different categories of workers with the wages they
earn. Under certain conditions, the wage premiums for worker characteristics should equal the
productivity benefits associated with them. I find that equality holds strongly for the most developed
country in the sample (Zimbabwe), but not at all for the least developed country (Tanzania).
Differences between wage and productivity premiums are most pronounced for characteristics that
are clearly related to human capital, such as schooling, training, experience, and tenure. Localized
labor markets, imperfect substitutability of different worker-types, sampling errors, and nonlinear
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Canada1 Motivation
In the textbook economics world, markets are the most eﬃcient institution to allocation
scarce resources. They clear all the time, equalizing demand and supply, opportunities
are arbitraged away, and all production factors are paid their marginal productivity. In
the real world, there are frictions, unobservable characteristics, adjustment costs, erroneous
expectations, and maybe even discrimination, all of which can distort the market equilibrium
away from eﬃcient allocation. This should not necessarily worry us, economists, as the theory
is only intended to be a stylized version of reality. However, I will present evidence that the
extent to which the theory fails a reality check is negatively correlated with the degree of
economic development of a country. In particular, I will show that the less developed a
country is, the less equal the remuneration for workers’ characteristics is to the marginal
contributions the same characteristics make in production. The elements omitted from the
theory have predictive power with respect to the level of development.1
A well-functioning labor market should perform at least two tasks; matching ﬁrms and
workers and setting wages. It should allocate workers to enterprises with highest productivity
or the best future prospects. Through reallocation of workers between ﬁrms or industries,
the labor market can provide a positive contribution to aggregate productivity growth. Van
Biesebroeck (2002) investigates the eﬀectiveness of labor markets in several African countries
in performing this task and ﬁnds that the reallocation mechanism is less eﬀective than in
the United States.
A second aspect of labor market eﬃciency is to determine a wage rate such that charac-
teristics are rewarded at their marginal products. If labor markets function as spot markets
without imperfect information and ﬁrms maximize proﬁts or minimize costs, we would expect
diﬀerences to be arbitraged away. If diﬀerences remain, workers are not provided with the
correct incentives to choose the optimal level of investment in human capital characteristics,
1Only three countries are included in this analysis, but the patterns are very consistent across charac-
teristics and the results are robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations. I believe the results will generalize to other
countries. A partial analysis with data from Cameroon (almost as developed as Zimbabwe) and Burundi
(even less developed than Tanzania) conﬁrms the patterns I describe here. I did not include those countries
in the full analysis because the data was deemed less reliable, the sample size too small, and information on
some variables missing.
2such as schooling or tenure. Previous papers comparing wage and productivity returns in
developed countries—Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) for the United States, Prez-
Duarte, Crepon, and Deniau (2001) for France, and Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) for
Israel—ﬁnd equal wage and productivity returns for almost all characteristics.
In this paper, I investigate the pattern of rewards to diﬀerent worker characteristics using
individual- and plant-level data for three African countries that vary signiﬁcantly by level
of development. I ﬁnd that in the most developed economy, Zimbabwe, characteristics are
rewarded at their marginal productivity, while such equality can be ﬁrmly rejected for the
least developed economy, Tanzania. In the country with an intermediate level of develop-
ment, Kenya, the results are also intermediate. Equal remuneration can be rejected for
some characteristics, e.g. experience, but not for others, e.g. schooling. Making the same
comparison using a richer set of characteristics reveals that the breakdown in correct remu-
neration for less developed economies is most pronounced for characteristics that contributed
to general—as opposed to ﬁrm-speciﬁc—human capital: schooling and experience.
More developed countries somehow manage to reward worker characteristics such that
the return to the ﬁrm matches the return to the worker. With equal private and social
returns, investment in human capital will be optimal without need for subsidies. One of
the most illuminating examples of the diﬀerent reward structure across countries is provided
by the return to formal training, taken during employment. The productivity boost a ﬁrm
enjoys for training its workers is large and relatively uniform across countries, ranging from
44% in Zimbabwe to 77% in Kenya. The beneﬁt in higher salary to the workers, on the
other hand, is less uniform. Workers with training only get a paltry 4.5% salary increase in
Tanzania, 17% in Kenya, while Zimbabwean trainees receive a 78% salary boost. Less than
one tenth of the plant-level gains accrue to the worker in Tanzania and less than a quarter in
Kenya. In Zimbabwe, workers receive more than the direct productivity gain they produce,
possibly because the eﬀects spill over and improve the productivity of co-workers. It will be
much easier for Zimbabwean employers to retain these highly productive employees and to
motivate others to participate in productivity-boosting training programs.
As pointed out by Fafchamps (1997) in the introduction to a symposium on “Markets in
Sub-Saharan Africa”, one should be careful not to assume outright that markets are eﬃcient,
3regardless of the institutions required to perform their function. At the same time, one
should also not conclude that markets work ineﬃciently in Africa, simply because they look
diﬀerent from Western markets. Often, they simply adjusted to the speciﬁc circumstances,
such as information asymmetries, enforcement problems, and geographic isolation. I will
perform several speciﬁcation checks for the results, exploring alternative explanations such
as localized labor markets, imperfect substitutability between workers, and sampling error
for the discrepancy between wage and productivity eﬀects.
From a policy perspective, an investigation into the link between wages and productivity
is important for at least two reasons. On the one hand, Knight and Sabot (1987) argue
that the higher output growth in Kenya in the ﬁrst decades since independence—relative
to the otherwise similar Tanzania—can be explained to a large extent by the diﬀerential
access to secondary education. They advocate increased investment in education as an
important tool for development. The Tanzanian plants in this sample have, on average, a
more educated workforce, but the productivity eﬀects of schooling fall far short of the wage
eﬀects. It illustrates that higher education does not translate automatically into higher
output. Another policy implication is regarding the measurement of productivity growth.
In most developed countries, growth in labor productivity is calculated by subtracting labor
growth from output growth, with labor calculated as a weighted average of several worker
types each weighted by their share in wages, see for example Jorgenson and Griliches (1967).
The motivation is that relative wages should equal relative productivity. If this equality fails
to hold in developing countries, productivity growth measures will be biased.
I start by introducing the countries and the employer-employee matched data in Section
2. In Section 3, the reward for diﬀerent characteristics is analyzed at the individual-level.
Mincer wage regressions are estimated using diﬀerent controls, diﬀerent sets of explanatory
variables, and exploiting diﬀerent sources of variations. The remainder of the analysis is
conducted at the plant-level. The measurement framework to compare wage premiums for
worker characteristics to the productivity eﬀects is introduced in Section 4. The previous
literature is surveyed in Section 5 and labor market eﬃciency is tested in Section 6. Sev-
eral robustness checks in Section 7 investigate the cause for the failure of wages to reﬂect
productivity diﬀerences. Section 8 concludes.
42 Data
The three countries included in the sample are middle-sized former British colonies in East
Africa that obtained independence in the early 1960s. The World Bank classiﬁes all three
as low income, even though they diﬀer substantially by level of development. One way
to gauge this is from the GDP per capita (in PPP), which stood at $477 in Tanzania in
1991, less than half of the $1092 obtained in Kenya, and only slightly more than one ﬁfth
of the GDP per capita of Zimbabwe. The diﬀerences are smaller comparing the human
development index, calculated by the United Nations, which also takes education and life
expectancy into account. In the most recent ranking, Tanzania occupies the 151st or (22nd
last) place with 0.440, putting it in the ”low development” category. Kenya and Zimbabwe
rank rather closely at places 134 and 128, with a score of 0.513 and 0.551, near the bottom
of the ”medium development” group.2
[Table 1]
The diﬀerent development levels of the countries is also reﬂected in the share of workers
employed in industry.3 Only 4.7% of all employment in Tanzania is in industry, while it is
almost double in Zimbabwe at 8.6% and intermediate in Kenya at 7.3%. The patterns of
employment shares in agriculture are the reverse. In Tanzania, almost half of all workers were
still employed in agriculture at the end of the 1990s and this share is declining fast (it stood
at 60% a decade earlier). In Kenya, the employment share of agriculture is much lower,
at 27.5%, but the transformation from agriculture to industry, and especially to services
is still in full swing. Two decades ago 42% of the working population worked on the land.
Zimbabwe, on the other hand, has seen a stable 18.5% of its workforce employed in agriculture
for the last 25 years.
Given that Zimbabwe is much more advanced in its industrial transformation, it is not
surprising that it far surpasses the other two countries in GDP per capita. The diﬀerence in
labor productivity in industry is even more stark. While industry workers in Kenya produce
2Norway tops the ranking with a score of 0.942.
3Manufacturing employment that matched manufacturing value added was not available for Tanzania in
1991.
5twice as much as Tanzanian workers, Zimbabwe’s output per worker outstrips Tanzania
by a factor of 1 to 7 and Kenya 1 to 4. It underscores the importance of developing a
strong manufacturing sector. Using World Bank statistics, Van Biesebroeck (2003) shows
that manufacturing workers in Tanzania earn 3.5 times more on average than agricultural
workers, while the ratio stands at 5.7 in Kenya and even 9.9 in Zimbabwe.4
Infrastructure statistics conﬁrm the diﬀerent levels of development of the three coun-
tries. Zimbabwe has 22km of paved highways per 1000 km2 of land, while the corresponding
numbers for Kenya and Tanzania are 15km and 4km. The same ranking is preserved in
kilometers of railroad by area, at respectively eight, ﬁve, and four kilometers, or airports per
million inhabitants, 1.4 in Zimbabwe, 0.6 in Kenya and 0.3 in Tanzania. In fact, almost any
conceivable statistic that one expects to be correlated with development produces the same
ranking: access to clean water, telephone penetration, school enrollments, infant mortality,
etc.5
Tanzania and Kenya each counted approximately 25 million inhabitants, while Zimbabwe
only had 10 million in 1991. The manufacturing sector, which I will focus on, is more evenly
sized because of the much higher importance in Zimbabwe. All countries count between
126,000 and 188,000 manufacturing workers. A stratiﬁed sample of manufacturing plants in
three consecutive years, provides the micro data used in the analysis.6 Approximately 200
plants were surveyed each year in each country, covering four broadly deﬁned manufacturing
sectors: food, textile and clothing, wood and furniture, metal and equipment. A maximum
of 10 employees per plant were interviewed each year.7 While plants could be linked over
time as a panel, this was not possible for the workers.
4Export diversiﬁcation is another important beneﬁt of developing a strong manufacturing sector. Coﬀee
and tea bring in 52% of foreign exchange in Tanzania and 54% in Kenya. It makes these countries very
vulnerable to price volatility on only two world markets, especially because they spend respectively 53% and
38% of all foreign exchange on investment. For more details, see Van Biesebroeck (2003).
5Only life expectancy at birth gives a reverse ranking, but this is due to the staggering HIV infection
rate, aﬀecting one third of the adult population in Zimbabwe and almost one sixth in Kenya.
6The data was collected between 1991 and 1995 by three diﬀerent research teams, coordinated by the
Regional Program of Enterprise Development at the World Bank. Sampling was stratiﬁed by size to give
(the plant of) each manufacturing worker equal probability to be included in the sample.
7In Zimbabwe, workers were only interviewed in the ﬁrst and second year.
6The resulting sample is an unbalanced panel of plants with, on average, 110 to 183 ob-
servations per year in each country. In the ﬁrst year, the plants employed 19,383 to 58,108
workers and 619 to 1206 of them were interviewed. A large part of the manufacturing sector
is covered by this sample. The value added produced by the sample ﬁrms makes up 31% of
manufacturing GDP in Tanzania, 17% in Kenya, and 26% in Zimbabwe. The share of all
manufacturing workers that are employed by plants included in the sample is substantially
lower in the ﬁrst two countries. The stratiﬁed sampling yielded signiﬁcantly larger than
average plants.
For the plants in the sample, the diﬀerences between the countries are equally pronounced.
The median plant in Tanzania achieves only 38% of the labor productivity of the median plant
in Kenya, while labor productivity in Zimbabwe is 42% higher than in Kenya. Total factor
productivity numbers, taken from Van Biesebroeck (2002), show similar diﬀerences when
capital intensity is taken into account. The median plant in Kenya is twice as productive
as in Tanzania, but achieves only two thirds of the productivity level of the median plant
in Zimbabwe. The salary diﬀerences between the countries match the labor productivity
diﬀerences rather well. Workers in Tanzania earn 27.4% of the average salary in Zimbabwe,
while the median labor productivity at their employers stands at 26.8%. Salaries in Kenya, on
average $120, are slightly lower than one would predict from the relative labor productivity,
which would imply a salary of approximately $140. The statistics for the sample conﬁrm
that Zimbabwe is by far the most developed country of the three, while Tanzania is lagging
far behind.
The remainder of Table 1 provides averages and standard errors for the variables used
in the analysis. Workers in Zimbabwe work on average in larger plants, are slightly older,
stay longer with the same ﬁrm and are more likely to receive (or choose to enroll in) formal
training once they are employed. The sample of workers in Kenya is even more dominated by
males and unions are less popular than in the other countries. In Tanzania, workers receive
the lowest salaries, but paradoxically they have the highest years of schooling. How these
characteristics are rewarded is analyzed in the next section.
73 The wage premium for diﬀerent characteristics
Because information on productivity is only available at the plant-level, individual wages
have to be aggregated to carry out the comparison. To make sure that the aggregation does
not obscure how an individual’s characteristics are rewarded at the most detailed level, I ﬁrst
estimate a wage equation at the individual level. Diﬀerent speciﬁcations of a log-linear wage
regression, motivated by a model of human capital as in Mincer (1974), are estimated. The
ﬁrst column for each country in Table 2 contains the baseline speciﬁcation with gender, years
of experience on the job market, and years of formal education as explanatory variables. I
do not include a dummy for marital status as is usually done because this question was not
asked in Kenya in one of the years and almost a ﬁfth of Tanzanian workers did not answer
it. Relative to the usual speciﬁcation for the U.S., I also omit information on race. This
was deemed a sensitive question and was only included in select years. In some countries,
especially Tanzania, there are so many ethnicities that it would be impossible to control for
all groups. The only speciﬁcation that produced meaningful results, was the inclusion of
a dummy for non-African workers. In most cases, foreigners are owners or higher manage-
ment and their wage premiums range from 70% to 120%. Because this eﬀect is unrelated
to the reason race dummies are included in regressions for developed countries—potential
discrimination—I omit the race variable. In every regression, I do include dummies to control
for time, sector, and location.
The gender premium for males is relatively small in Tanzania and Zimbabwe and nonex-
istent in Kenya. Moreover, it is estimated very imprecisely. The returns to experience and
schooling, on the other hand, are estimated very precisely. They decline with the level of
development in the country. While in Tanzania an extra year of experience brings 2.3%
higher salary and a year of education 6.8%, the rewards drop to 1% and 4.9% in Zimbabwe.
The Tanzanian results are most alike results for manufacturing workers in the United States.
The estimated returns include the reward to eﬀort and ability insofar as they are observ-
able to the employer and correlated with schooling or experience. Self-selection into the
salaried labor market and into the manufacturing sector, which is likely to be nonnegligible
in Africa, also inﬂuences the coeﬃcient estimates if it is correlated with one of the explana-
8tory variables.8 Note that the explanatory power of the regressions declines in line with the
estimated returns to schooling and experience. The results are not directly comparable with
those in Bigsten et al. (2000) due to diﬀerent speciﬁcations (especially the quadratic terms
and inclusion of tenure), but many eﬀects correspond well.9
[Table 2]
The second speciﬁcations in Table 2 have additional occupation dummies as controls, and
the third columns control for ﬁrm-size dummies instead. These extra controls are intended
to help interpreting the previous coeﬃcient estimates and put the magnitudes of the eﬀects
in context. Results for the United States in Groschen (1991) show that male and female
workers doing the same job in the same establishment earn very similar wages. There is
substantial segmentation in the labor market. Women are disproportionately employed in
lower paying establishments and occupations, each of which explains approximately half of
the 11% gross salary diﬀerential by gender in manufacturing plants.
In Africa, the results are reversed. Controlling for occupation increases the gender pay
diﬀerential in each country. More careful inspection of the data reveals that women are
more likely to be employed in nonproduction occupations, such as oﬃce support or sales,
that pay on average higher wages. Controlling for occupation raises the gender gap to 8.5%
in Tanzania, 13.5% and 18.5% in Zimbabwe. The changes in the gender wage gap are mixed
when controls for ﬁrm-size are introduced. In Tanzania, the diﬀerence increases, indicating
that women are more likely to work for larger employers. Almost 50% of all women, against
only 34% of men, work in plants that employ at least 50 workers. In Kenya, there is
no gender segmentation by plant-size and in Zimbabwe the eﬀects works in the opposite
direction. Women are less likely to work for large plants that pay more on average, which
explains almost two thirds of the gross wage gap. Given that the gender eﬀects are most
sensitive to the exact set of controls and not comparable to developed countries’ results, they
8Most of the results discussed in Schultz (1988) refer to average returns in the population at large and
are incomparable with my results. The result for Ghana in Schultz (1999) match the returns to schooling I
estimate for Zimbabwe.
9A full survey of the returns to education estimated from Mincer wage regressions in sub-Saharan Africa
is in Appleton, Hoddinott, and Mackinnon (1996).
9will not ﬁgure prominently in the wage-productivity comparison. The relative labor market
experience in Africa for the sexes is markedly diﬀerent from developed countries and a more
nuanced discussion of the pay diﬀerentials by sex is beyond the scope of this paper.
Changes in the returns to education and experience after controlling for occupation or
plant-size are uniform across countries. Segmentation of more experienced and more highly
educated workers by ﬁrm-size, in the third column, accounts for 5% to 15% of the rewards
to experience and education. Running the regressions separately by ﬁrm size-class reveals
that the eﬀect on wages comes mostly through the intercept and less through the slope of
the earnings function. More educated and experienced workers are found in larger plants
that pay higher salaries, especially in Zimbabwe, while ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes pay similar
premiums for schooling and experience.
Segmentation by occupation, in the middle columns of Table 2, is even more important
and equally uniform across countries. In Kenya and Zimbabwe, at least half of the bene-
ﬁt of schooling comes from having access to a better paid occupation, even when the job
classiﬁcation is relatively coarse (I observe only 11 categories). In Tanzania a third of the
schooling premium accrues in terms of getting a better paid occupation. Experience also gets
a large part of its value, between 33% and 43%, from the extent it allows workers to move
up the occupational ladder. Adding the 11 occupation dummies to the regression raises the
explanatory power of the regression substantially, especially in Zimbabwe.
An obvious shortcoming of the speciﬁcation in Table 2 is the limitation to linear eﬀects.
Intuitively, we expect the returns to experience and schooling to taper oﬀ and they are likely
to be substitutes. Estimating individual wage regressions with quadratic and interaction
eﬀects yield some counterintuitive results: returns to schooling are convex in Tanzania and
Kenya and experience and schooling are complements in Tanzania. For Zimbabwe all results
are in line with U.S. ﬁndings. The short sample in the plant-level analysis limits our ability
to include quadratic and interaction eﬀects. A sensitivity check is performed in Section 7.4.
Finally, in the ﬁrst column of Table 3, I add more explanatory variables to the wage
regressions and still estimate with least squares. Few of the original variables change no-
ticeably. Only in Zimbabwe, the male wage premium disappears largely and the return the
10schooling drops by 1%. It is also the country with the highest return to formal training, so
it is not implausible to see the largest decline in the return to pre-employment education.
The wage premium for workers that received formal training (excluding on-the-job training)
is positive in all countries and especially large in Zimbabwe, exceeding 30%. Training is
more valuable relative to education if the country is more developed. Relative to schooling,
training can be interpreted as a proxy for more ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills. Similarly as schooling, it
is likely to include a return to unobserved ability or eﬀort as selection for a training program
is at the discretion of the employer and ﬁnishing a training program is likely to require extra
eﬀort on behalf of the employee.
[Table 3]
Introducing a tenure variable, measuring the number of years an employee has spent
with his current employer, hardly changes the return to experience or schooling. Rewards to
tenure are estimated to be negative for Tanzania, but positive and slightly higher than half of
the return to experience in the two more developed countries. Relative to experience, tenure
can be interpreted as a proxy for the accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills. Alternatively, it
can capture a reward for loyalty to the current employer, a type of eﬃciency wage. I also
ﬁnd that union workers are paid less than nonunion workers and members of the owner’s
family are paid below average in Zimbabwe, but they receive a higher salary in the two less
developed countries. Closer inspection of the data reveals that within occupation categories,
salary is often positively correlated with union status.
All of the coeﬃcients estimated by least squares in Tables 2 and the ﬁrst column of Table
3, capture both a within and between ﬁrm eﬀect. For example, the higher salary for male
workers can be the result of men getting on average higher salaries than women within a
given ﬁrm or men can be disproportionately employed in ﬁrms that pay higher salaries, a
between eﬀect, even without diﬀerential pay by gender. The second and third columns in
Table 3 separately identify the magnitude of both eﬀects. In most cases they work in the
same direction. For example, more experienced or more highly educated workers are paid
more than their coworkers and they tend to work for plants that pay all employees more on
average. In the case of experience, both eﬀects are approximately equal in size, while the
11between ﬁrm eﬀect substantially exceeds the within eﬀect for the return to schooling.
The comparison between wages and productivity, in Section 6, is carried out at the plant-
level, identifying the returns to characteristics by variation across plants. When both the
within and between eﬀect work in the same direction, the interpretation is straightforward.
When both eﬀects have opposite sign, caution is warranted. The interpretation of the wage
diﬀerential by gender is thus complicated. The average male worker receives a higher salary
in all three countries. In Tanzania and Zimbabwe, this is solely the result of higher wages
for men within plants. The pay diﬀerential is reduced by sorting of men towards low-paying
employers. Comparing average earnings across plants will show a negative wage premium
for men, because plants that employ a high proportion of men pay lower salaries on average,
even though men employed in those plants still earn more than their female coworkers. This
complicates further the interpretation of the gender dummy.
Similar caution should be exerted in interpreting the coeﬃcient for family members in
Kenya and Zimbabwe. Within each plant family members are paid higher salaries than other
employees, but they tend to work for plants that pay lower average salaries. In Zimbabwe
the between eﬀects dominates, resulting in lower pay in total, while in Kenya the within
eﬀect leads to higher pay for family members. Tanzania is the only country where ﬁrms that
oﬀer high salaries are also more likely to employ family members and both eﬀects work in
the same direction. Perhaps not surprisingly, the coeﬃcient on the share of workers that are
related to the owner as an explanatory variable in the production function turns out to be
signiﬁcantly negative in each of the three countries. It is interesting to note that most of the
lower pay for union workers is a within plant eﬀect, while segregation of employees reduces
the diﬀerential. Unionized workers are employed at plants that pay higher wages. In the
production function a unionization share yields a positive coeﬃcient in each country. Union
members either choose to work in very productive ﬁrms or that they raise the productivity
level of their employers. The higher salary for workers that received training is largely a
between eﬀect, while the within eﬀect is constant across countries.
The positive coeﬃcient on tenure could be the result of ﬁrms raising salaries for employees
with high tenure. On the other hand, workers could choose to stay for a longer time with
employers that oﬀer high pay in general. Both interpretations are plausible, but only the
12second one is backed up by the data. In Kenya and, especially, in Zimbabwe, workers stay
longer with well-paying employers and this explains the positive wage premium for tenure
entirely. In contrast, workers with high tenure in Tanzania are more likely to be employed
at low-paying employers. To sustain such a pattern there have to be switching costs in the
labor market.
The results in Tables 2-3 sketch a fairly comprehensive picture of the returns to diﬀerent
characteristics and how they diﬀer across countries by level of development. The next task
is to line up the wage premiums for diﬀerent characteristics with their productivity impact.
The results of that analysis are in Section 6. First, I introduce a framework to carry out the
comparison in the following Section.
4 A measurement framework
The methodology owes a great deal to Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999). If labor
markets are eﬃcient, operate as a spot market, and ﬁrms minimize costs the wage premium
of a worker should equal its productivity premium. Barring imperfect information, any
diﬀerence will be arbitraged away. Both premiums will be identiﬁed by jointly estimating
a wage equation and production function at the plant-level. As an example, assume that
the productivity of male workers exceeds the average productivity of female workers by φM
percentage. The production function can be written as a function of capital and both types
of labor (men and women),
Q = A f(K, LF + (1 + φM)LM).
Note that men and women are assumed to be perfect substitutes. This assumption is inves-
tigates later (see Section 7.2. In this case, the ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm entail that















Jointly estimating the wage (λM) and productivity (φM) premiums associated with each
characteristic allows me to test for equality in equation (1) for several characteristics in-
dividually or jointly. Traditionally, researchers have been concerned with a potential bias
introduced by unobserved worker ability in the wage equation or unobserved productivity in
the production function. Joint estimation should largely alleviate such concerns as the bias
works in the same direction for both equations. The unobservables are to a large extent two
sides of the same coin.10 I am only interested in the relative magnitudes of the coeﬃcients
in each equation, which should be less aﬀected.
Because both equations are estimated at the plant-level, identiﬁcation of the wage and
productivity eﬀects comes from correlation across plants of the composition of the workforce
with average salaries and output. The discussion of the between and within estimates in
Table 3 showed that, in general, the magnitude and sign of the coeﬃcients estimated from
the variation across plants corresponded well to the gross wage-eﬀect of the characteristics
estimated at the individual-level.
For joint estimation, I have to derive a plant-level wage equation consistent with the
Mincer (1974) model of human capital. Sticking with the earlier example, deﬁne a wage
equation for the individual as,
Wi = wFFi + wMMi.
The average wage paid to women is wF—Fi is dummy that takes on the value of one if
individual i is a women—and wM to men. Aggregating the wage equation to the plant-level
gives
W = wFLF + wMLM




10See for example Frazer (2001) where this assumption is exploited to control for unobserved ability in the
wage equation.












Nonlinear least squares estimation produces an estimate of the average baseline wage (for
female workers) and of the gender wage premium. The only information needed is the average
wage and the proportion of male workers by plant.
Assuming the Cobb-Douglas functional form and perfect substitutability between male
and female workers, the production function can be written in logarithms as11
lnQ = lnA + αK lnK + αL ln ˜ L + .
Male and female workers are aggregated in ˜ L, where each type of employee (LF and LM) is
multiplied by its relative productivity level (1 or 1+φM),
˜ L = LF + (1 + φM)LM




L is the total labor force (LF + LM). Substituting (3) in the production function allows
estimation of the gender productivity gap by nonlinear least squares from just the proportion
of male workers in each ﬁrm and the usual output and input variables.
Generalizing this approach to construct a wage and production equation with more dimen-
sions on which workers diﬀer is limited by the data. At the very least, I want to diﬀerentiate
workers by gender, experience and schooling. If each characteristic divides workers into
two groups, three characteristics deﬁne eight categories of workers (unexperienced, educated
males, etc.). Because I observe a maximum of ten workers in each plant, the proportion of
each group in each plant’s workforce will be estimated extremely inaccurate. Making three
11It is straightforward to generalize the methodology to other functional forms.
15assumptions for each characteristic, or rather three sets of assumptions, lets me avoid this
type of dimensional problem.
Gender is indicated by M or F subscript, experience by Y or X (young versus high
experience), and schooling by U or S (uneducated versus high schooling). I assume, for
example, that the relative number of workers, the relative productivity, and the relative
wages by gender are constant in each experience-schooling category. In eﬀect, this is an
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption on the relative number of workers and








































and similarly for other characteristics. This allows the simpliﬁcation of the labor aggre-
gate in the production function from eight terms, one for each worker category, to three
multiplicative factors, one for each characteristic:
˜ L = LFY S + (1 + φFXS)LFXS + (1 + φMY S)LMY S + ... + (1 + φMXU)LMXU
= L [1 + φM
LM
L
] [1 + φX
LX
L




and similarly in the wage equation. If the number of characteristics increases, one can proceed
in the same fashion, adding factors to (5). With more characteristics included, it becomes
even more indispensable to make the assumptions that all ratios are equal conditional on
the other characteristics, as in (4). These assumptions cannot be tested, or we would have
avoided making them. In the small sample of employees we observe at each ﬁrm, some ratios
will obviously not be equal, but this can readily arise if only a limited number of employees
are sampled.12 The assumption of perfect substitutability between workers with diﬀerent
12For some plants, enough workers are observed that the assumptions in (4) can be rejected. To rationalize
such observations, I have to invoke some measurement error. If enough employees are observed per plant,
some of the assumptions underlying the construction of the labor aggregate in (5) can be relaxed. For
16characteristics is investigated in Section 7.2.
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where λ0 = wFY U is the base salary for a female, inexperienced, uneducated worker. λM,λX,
and λS are the wage premiums associated with gender, experience (high versus low), and
education (high versus low). Equations (6) and (7) are estimated jointly with Zellner’s
seemingly unrelated regression estimator, allowing for correlation between the two error
terms.
When characteristics vary continuously, such as schooling or experience, the derivation
of both equations is more complicated. Frazer (2001) demonstrates how to derive a human
capital term in the production function consistent with Mincer (1974). The labor composite
˜ L in (5) can be written as the sum of all workers Lj with each type of worker j multiplied
by its human capital component. The adjustment takes the form of eφ0+φSSj+φXXj, if types
diﬀer by schooling and experience. A ﬁrst order Taylor approximation of the production
function with the nonlinear human capital factors produces a log-linear equation.13 The
example, if we have enough observations to calculate the number of employees with high experience and
schooling separately by gender, we do not have the impose equal productivity and wage diﬀerentials by
gender in each sub-group (high and low schooling or experience). Instead, we can separately calculate high
and low educated workers by gender. We will still have to assume that the average experience is similar across
each of the four groups deﬁned by education and gender. If the outside category is female, inexperienced,
uneducated workers (FY U) the labor aggregate in the production function (˜ L) can be written as




















and similarly for the wage equation. Categorical variables that take on more than two variables can be
accounted for similarly.
13Frazer (2001) further illustrates that a second order approximation of the production function consistent
with a Mincer wage regression with continuous experience and schooling measures involves the inclusion of
variance and covariance terms of the characteristics by plant in the equations. Because of the limited number
of workers I have available per plant in my sample (a maximum of 10), I refrain from doing so. When the
returns for characteristics are modeled as quadratic instead of linear, see Section 7.4, I will be forced to
17logarithm of output is a function of capital and labor, also in logarithms, and the average
schooling attainment and experience over all workers in the plant:
lnQ = α0 + αK lnK + αL [ln ˜ L + φX ¯ X + φS ¯ S ] +  (7
0)
With continuously measured variables, arbitrarily cutoﬀ levels are avoided. For education,
plausible cutoﬀ levels are suggested at years when degrees are conferred, but for experience
or tenure the classiﬁcation of workers is arbitrary. Gender and other inherently discrete
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and similarly for the wage equation. The full models adds continuous terms for years of tenure




Even though the question whether wages equal productivity is acknowledged as an interesting
and important one, data limitations have hampered empirical testing. Variations of the
approach I outlined—limited to discrete characteristics—have been applied to a number of
countries. What is needed to estimate the model is input, output, and average wage data
at the plant-level, which are widely available. In addition, one needs to observe the average
values for a number of worker characteristics or the ratio of workers that display a certain
characteristic. Because such questions are rarely posed directly in plant-surveys, researchers
have relied on employer-employee data sets to estimate average values for each plant from
the fraction of employees that are observed.14
introduce a second order approximation.
14I perform two types of Monte Carlo analysis to verify to what extent the results are sensitive to sampling
error in the ﬁrst estimation stage.
18In the United States Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) ﬁnd that women are 16%
less productive, but paid 45% less than their male coworkers. The bulk of the gender wage
gap cannot be explained by diﬀerential productivity. College graduates, on the other hand,
are 67% more productive on average and only paid 43% more. In a sense, they are also
discriminated against in the U.S. labor market, although the diﬀerence is not statistically
signiﬁcant. Similar work for France in Prez-Duarte, Crepon, and Deniau (2001) and for
Israel in Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) ﬁnds no gender discrimination. In each country,
the remuneration for only a single characteristic diﬀered signiﬁcantly from the productivity
eﬀect associated with it. In France, older workers are signiﬁcantly overpaid relative to their
productivity level, while engineers are signiﬁcantly underpaid in Israel.
Using RPED data for Ghana, Jones (2001) estimates a plant-level production function
jointly with an individual-level wage equations. Unfortunately, no information is provided
on the estimation method. When combining individual and plant-level data in one joint
estimation, it is not immediately obvious what the most plausible assumptions are on the
variance-covariance matrix. She ﬁnds that women are 42% to 62% less productive and paid
12% to 15% less. No formal test is reported, but the standard errors are fairly large. The
reward for an extra year of schooling equals the productivity gain associated with it, both
are 7%. When diﬀerent discrete levels of education attainment are used, the results are am-
biguous. Sometimes the wage premium exceeds the productivity contribution, for example,
for primary education the diﬀerence is almost fourfold. For other education categories the
productivity eﬀect dominates, e.g. for vocational, polytechnic, and university education.
Even though many diﬀerences are large in absolute value—ﬁve of the eight estimated diﬀer-
entials exceed 20%—none of the formal tests ﬁnds a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence. The
education coeﬃcients in the production function are estimated especially imprecisely.15
One of the goals in Bigsten et al. (2000) is to calculate returns to education, also using
RPED data for ﬁve sub-Saharan countries (including Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe). Look-
15Another problem with her analysis is the inclusion of experience squared in the plant-level production
function. In Section 7.4 quadratic terms are introduced into the return to education and experience. When
such returns are aggregated up to the plant level, one needs to include the variance for each characteristic
by plant in the regression. Another puzzling ﬁnding is the decreasing returns to scale technology, which
conﬂicts with most production function estimations for Ghana that usually ﬁnd increasing returns.
19ing only at the wage equation in isolation, they ﬁnd the highest education-induced salary
increase in Zimbabwe, the most developed economy, and the lowest increase in Ghana, the
country with the least developed manufacturing sector in their sample. Separate estimates of
the production function with ad-hoc measures for human capital (such as lagged education)
produces highly signiﬁcant and positive impact of human capital on output, but low implied
rates of return. In particular, the return to human capital is only a fraction of the return to
physical capital.
Another related study is by Benjamin (1995). He points out that some of the agricultural
economics literature prematurely concluded in favor of ineﬃcient markets to explain an
inverse relationship between labor productivity and farm size. In theory, higher output per
worker on smaller farms is consistent with higher unobserved land quality at those farms.
Using instrumental variable techniques, he shows that accounting for such unobservable
land quality completely eliminates the inverse productivity-size relationship. In Section
7, I perform several robustness checks to investigate alternative explanations—other than
market imperfections—for the gap between measured wage and productivity returns. For
an unobservable input in the production function to have the same equalizing eﬀect in this
paper, it should be most strongly correlated with average experience of workers across plants;
the variable for which equality of wage and productivity returns fails most markedly.
Finally, Velenchik (1997) investigates urban labor markets in Zimbabwe, using some of
the same RPED data that I use in this study. She mainly looks at the worker data, ignoring
much of the information on productivity diﬀerentials between ﬁrms, contained in the plant-
level data. One of her principal ﬁndings is that proﬁt growth of the employer has a positive
coeﬃcient in a wage growth regression. She interprets this as an indication of rent sharing
between workers and employers and as evidence against eﬃciency wages. This ﬁnding is not
inconsistent with our approach in this paper, as productivity is likely to have an impact on
wages as well as ﬁrm proﬁtability. The stylized fact is that workers with high wage growth
work for plants with high rates of proﬁt growth. This is fully consistent with an eﬃcient
labor market—if more able workers make the ﬁrm more proﬁtable and receive higher salaries
in return—and only indicative of rent sharing if rising proﬁtability causes or precedes the
wage growth.
206 Results
The estimation results by country for equations (8) and (9), with continuously measured
experience and schooling, are in Table 4. As with the individual data, the gender wage
gaps are estimated imprecisely with varying size and magnitudes. Plants that employ a
high proportion of men are invariable more productive, but as mentioned earlier, it might
be because men are more productive or because they tend to work for more productive
ﬁrms. Regardless of the cause, the results indicate that diﬀerences in pay by gender do not
correspond well to productivity diﬀerences. Perhaps surprisingly for Africa, the results tend
to suggest that men are underpaid, although the diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
[Table 4]
The wage returns to experience and schooling, on the other hand, are precisely estimated
and correspond well to the previous results. Salaries rise substantially with experience in
Tanzania and Kenya, but not in Zimbabwe, where education is rewarded higher than in the
two other countries. The eﬀect of experience and education in the production function follow
a consistent pattern. Both eﬀects rise with the degree of development. In Tanzania, expe-
rience contributes negatively to productivity, while higher education contributes nothing.
In Kenya, there is no discernable eﬀect of experience on production, while schooling con-
tributes positively, although not in proportion to the wage premium paid for education. In
Zimbabwe, the individual return—in the form of higher salary—and the plant return—higher
output—associated with experience and schooling match almost perfectly.
The gaps in the salary and productivity premium for experience and schooling are highest
in Tanzania, at respectively 4.8% and 6.0% and they are still sizeable in Kenya, at 2.8% and
3.3%. In Zimbabwe, the gaps are 0.3% and 1.2% and equality of the returns cannot be
rejected at all with a formal statistical tests. The p-values are 0.81 and 0.75. In the two
less developed countries, equality of the returns to experience can ﬁrmly be rejected, even
at a 1% signiﬁcance level. The same holds for schooling in Tanzania (at a 10% signiﬁcance
level), but not in Kenya. The diﬀerent conclusions cannot simply be attributed to less precise
coeﬃcient estimates for Zimbabwe, which has only slightly higher standard errors. The joint
21test for equality of the returns to each of the three characteristics conﬁrms the pattern. In
Tanzania, by far the least developed economy, the p-value of the Wald test for joint equality
is only 1%. In Kenya, the p-value still tends towards rejection at 5%, largely due to the high
wage premium for experience that is not backed up by any productivity gains. In Zimbabwe,
none of the diﬀerences between the estimated coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant, and
the same is true for the joint test.
The largest discrepancy between wage and productivity premium is for experience. In the
two least developed countries, workers get substantial pay increases over their career, which
are not matched by any discernible productivity eﬀect. The return to schooling exceeds
its eﬀect on productivity in each country, but the extent diﬀers widely. An extra year of
schooling raises the average salary in Tanzania by 6% even though there is no productivity
eﬀect to speak of. In Kenya, the return to schooling is much larger, 9.1%, which still exceeds
the productivity it brings the employer by more than half. In Zimbabwe, the excess return
to schooling is kept to a moderate 1.2% per year, which is only 10% of the productivity gain
a year of schooling brings on average.
Qualitatively the same and quantitatively very similar results are obtained when experi-
ence and schooling are included as dummy variables—high versus low—, see Table A.1 in the
Appendix. The extent to which joint equality of the return to characteristics can be rejected
decreases with the level of development in the country and the rejection is the strongest for
experience.
The input coeﬃcients in the production function are estimated precisely and the point
estimates are plausible. Returns to scale are estimated to be slightly increasing, but only in
Kenya do they signiﬁcantly exceed one (at a 5% signiﬁcance level). The relative importance
of capital and the labor aggregate is rather similar for each country. Only in Zimbabwe, is
the number of hours worked signiﬁcant in the wage regression. Workers that work longer
receive on average a higher hourly wage, which mimics similar results for the United States.
Including more explanatory variables in the wage equation and production function, re-
sults are in Table 5, identiﬁes more characteristics that are rewarded diﬀerently from their
22productivity eﬀect.16 The gender coeﬃcients vary somewhat, but are still measured inaccu-
rately. Experience is still rewarded with higher salary increases than the productivity eﬀect
warrants, especially in Tanzania, to some extent in Kenya, and not at all in Zimbabwe. The
wage premium associated with schooling increases slightly in the poorest two countries, while
some of the eﬀect in Zimbabwe is taken over by the new variables, most likely training. The
gap in wage and productivity premium associated with schooling decreases for Tanzania,
but it increases for Kenya. Only in Zimbabwe are the two estimates similar, as before.
[Table 5]
Inclusion of a variable measuring the tenure of an employee at his current employer,
conditional on experience, indicates that tenure is particularly well rewarded in Zimbabwe,
where it matches the 1.7% increase in production that is associated with an average year
of tenure. The gap between the individual and plant return is, again, largest in Tanzania
and intermediate in Kenya. The same is true for formal training. In the two least developed
countries, workers that receive training are paid more, but they receive only a fraction of
the beneﬁt a ﬁrm reaps from training. In Zimbabwe, the wage premium for workers exceeds
the productivity eﬀect. Together with the higher return to tenure than to experience, the
compensation patterns will help to reduce worker turnover, especially of those valuable
employees that received training. This is borne out by a cursory look at the correlation
between training and tenure at the individual-level. Controlling for experience, workers with
a longer tenure are more likely to have completed a training program. On average, workers
that have completed training were employed for half a year longer at their last employer,
which is signiﬁcantly positive. The relationship is particularly strong in Zimbabwe, but
hardly noticeable in Kenya.
It is illuminating to compare the size and composition of the salary and productivity
increases over a worker’s career across countries. A Tanzanian employee that remains with
the same employer will see his salary grow by 0.6% on average, while the salary increase would
16The results in Table 5 rely on continuous measures for schooling, experience, and tenure. The corre-
sponding results in Table A.2 in the Appendix measure those variables discretely. The results are, again,
very similar.
23be higher if he changed employers. The productivity of workers declines by almost 3% per
year and this is not inﬂuenced by job changes. In Kenya, salaries for loyal employees increase
by 3.2% a year, approximately one sixth more than for workers that change employers, even
though there is very little productivity growth, 1% if a worker does not changes employers,
none otherwise. In Zimbabwe, the wage and productivity increases match remarkably well
and they mostly accrue with tenure, not general experience. Controlling for tenure, as a
proxy for ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills, and education and training, as a proxy for general skills, lowers
the return to experience almost to zero.
A joint test for the hypothesis that for the four variables that determine the human
capital component in a plant—experience, schooling, tenure, training—wage premiums equal
productivity premiums is rejected for Tanzania at the 5% signiﬁcance level. For Kenya, it
can only be rejected if we are willing to tolerate a 15% signiﬁcance level. The hypothesis can
never be rejected for Zimbabwe. The tests follow the same pattern as the joint test with the
restricted set of variables and it emerges even more strongly from the results with discrete
variables in Table A.2 in the Appendix: the probability of rejection decreases with the level
of development.
Relative to the productivity eﬀects, experience and schooling are over-rewarded in the
two poorest countries, while the reverse is true for training and tenure. Workers can be
expected to underinvest in the latter two characteristics. In Zimbabwe, tenure and training
(in addition to schooling) carry the highest reward, but both also bring large productivity
gains. Training is rewarded even more than the direct productivity eﬀects warrants. This is
not necessarily ineﬃcient as ﬁrms might beneﬁt from spillover eﬀects to other employees or,
alternatively, the higher salary associated with training helps to retain the most experienced
workers, who are paid slightly below their marginal productivity.
Performing separate tests for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc aspects of human capital—tenure and
training—and general human capital—experience and schooling—points to the general char-
acteristics as the drivers for the correlation between equality of returns and development level
of the country. Firms in each country seem to reward ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics in rela-
tion to their productivity, all p-values are high, although it should be noted that the eﬀects
of training are estimated especially imprecisely for Tanzania and Kenya. The diﬀerences
24between countries are especially stark for general characteristics, with a p-value of 0.03 for
Tanzania, 0.16 for Kenya, and 0.99 for Zimbabwe. Grouping characteristics diﬀerently—
schooling and training (learning), on the one hand, and experience and tenure (over time),
on the other—points again to the importance of experience. The failure to equalize re-
turns to general characteristics is driven mostly by experience, not by schooling. Much of
the sensitivity analysis in the next Section will focus on the wage-productivity gap for ex-
perience: a very large diﬀerence for Tanzania (4.7%), intermediate for Kenya (2.7%), and
almost perfect equality for Zimbabwe (0.1%). The underlying phenomenon is that over time
salaries increase with experience in Tanzania and Kenya and with tenure in Zimbabwe, while
productivity is more closely related to tenure than experience in each country.
It is interesting to note that including two more variables from Table 3 in the joint
estimation—dummies for a relationship with the owner and belonging to a labor union—
would yield markedly diﬀerent results.17 For the variables that have a less direct bearing
on human capital—gender, family member of owner, union—the pattern identiﬁed earlier
breaks down. It is in Tanzania that labor markets are most successful at lining up the
salary rewards with productivity eﬀects. Unfortunately, this seems to be less important in
developing a strong manufacturing sector. Gender and relation to the owner, for example,
cannot be changed by employees, so there is no need for correct incentives to obtain optimal
levels of investment or adoption.
If ﬁrms are cost-minimizing and labor markets work eﬃciently, diﬀerences between wage
and productivity eﬀects should be arbitraged away. Before jumping to conclusions, I in-
vestigate a number of alternative explanations for the disparities in returns. These can be
interpreted as robustness checks for the pattern that the extent to which characteristics are
rewarded in line with their productivity contribution is correlated with the level of develop-
ment of the country.
17Results available upon request.
257 Potential explanations
7.1 Localized labor markets
One feature of labor markets in developing countries that might explain the failure of wage
eﬀects to match productivity eﬀects is the segregation of economic activities by geographic
area. If workers rarely migrate between diﬀerent cities and daily commuting is impossible
because of poor transportation infrastructure, pooling ﬁrms that operate in diﬀerent cities
will produce misleading results. Reardon (1997) surveys some evidence that suggests lo-
calized labor markets are likely to be important in Africa. Reviewing studies of household
income surveys in several sub-Saharan countries, he concludes that the poor distribution of
nonfarm earnings implies market segmentation.
The small sample size makes it impossible to carry out the analysis separately by city.
Location dummies are included in all previous regressions, but this might not be enough
to control for local eﬀects. If unobserved productivity diﬀers by area of the country and
is correlated with the composition of the labor force, the estimates of the coeﬃcients on
characteristics will pick up some of the location eﬀect. If the relative wage rate for workers
with high and low education varies by region the wage diﬀerentials will only match produc-
tivity diﬀerences if plants are equally representative in all areas. Given the concentration
of the bulk of manufacturing activities in a couple of cities, this is unlikely to be the case.
Alternatively, if areas diﬀer in the relative abundance of diﬀerent types of workers, this will
give rise to diﬀerences in relative wages and ﬁrms will adjust their input mix.
One solution is to perform the analysis limiting ﬁrms to those located in the major city
of each country. Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, is one of the most important manufacturing
centers of East Africa and 350 of the 544 observations, 64% of the Kenyan sample, are located
here. In Tanzania, the main center of manufacturing activity is Arusha, which is close to
the border with Kenya, rather than the capital, Dar es Salaam. 41% of all plants in the
sample are located there. In Zimbabwe, manufacturing activity is less concentrated than in
the other countries. Still, 42% of the plants in the RPED sample are located in the capital,
Harare.
26[Table 6]
The results for the limited sample are in Table 6. For Tanzania, the gap between wage
and productivity eﬀects is slightly larger. The smaller sample yields less precise estimates
and increases the p-value for the tests of equality of eﬀects. Nevertheless, for most variables,
especially for experience, we still reject equality and the same conclusion remains for the
joint test. Local labor markets do not seem to be an explanation for the excess wage return
to the diﬀerent characteristics.18
The results for Kenya indicate that for experience the gap is cut in half, from 2.8% to
1.4%. For schooling and gender, all point estimates change very little. As rejection of equality
was mainly driven by the excess wage return to experience, the joint test for equality of all
three eﬀects now has a p-value of 0.25 and we fail to reject joint equality. Here, the local
labor market explanation seems to have some explanatory power. However, Nairobi is a lot
more developed than the rest of the country. No detailed local statistics are available, but
one could argue that Nairobi more closely resembles cities in Zimbabwe than other cities in
Kenya.
For Zimbabwe, equality can never be rejected, even thought the productivity eﬀect of
experience is estimated substantially higher and higher than the wage eﬀect. The joint
test for equality of the returns to all three characteristics gives the same ranking as before:
rejection is negatively correlated with the level of development in the country.
7.2 Imperfect substitutability
A crucial assumption underlying the estimation strategy is perfect substitutability between
all types of workers. In that case, cost minimizing ﬁrms are expected to arbitrage away wage
diﬀerences that do not correspond to productivity diﬀerences. With imperfect substitutabil-
ity, the marginal product of a male worker, for example, will depend on the share of male
workers already employed and on the other characteristics of the workforce. The average
productivity diﬀerences between male and female workers across plants, will not necessarily
18The same conclusion is obtained for the estimation that includes tenure and training, as in Table 5.
27match the average wage gap anymore.
In this Section, I will allow imperfect substitutability between workers with diﬀerent
levels of experience. This was the characteristic with the greatest gap between wage and
productivity returns in all previous tables. The most straightforward approach would be
to introduce two labor aggregates, one for each experience category, in the Cobb-Douglas
production function:
lnQ = α0 + αK lnK + αLX ln ˜ LX + αLY ln ˜ LY +  (10)
ln ˜ Lx = lnLx + ln(1 + φxM
LxM
Lx
) + ln(1 + φxS
LxS
Lx
) x = X, Y (11)
if schooling is modeled as a discrete variable—high versus low—or
ln ˜ Lx = lnLx + ln(1 + φxM
LxM
Lx
) + φxSSx x = X, Y, (12)
if schooling is measured continuously. In either case, one can assume that the fraction







L , or calculate two diﬀerent fractions. Similarly, the fraction of
highly educated workers or the average schooling attainment can be assumed constant across
experience categories or calculated separately. The elasticity of substitution between each
type of workers and between both types of workers and capital would be unity. The output
elasticities of each input, αK, αLX, and αLY, capture the relative importance of each in the
production function.
An even more general approach is to aggregate the two labor aggregates using the C.E.S.
functional form. While capital and (aggregate) labor have unitary elasticity of substitution,
the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent labor components can be estimated freely.
The production function becomes
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with the experience speciﬁc labor aggregates taking the form of (11) or (12). The constant
elasticity of substitution between the two labor types is σ = 1
1+ρ. Enforcing that the weights
28of the two experience categories sum to one, keeps returns to scale equal to αK + αL. In
principle, it is straightforward to generalize this and include more than two levels of experi-
ence. In practice, it will be impossible to calculate average schooling and fraction of males
separately for more ﬁnely deﬁned experience levels and the greater detail will not yield a
richer model.
The results for equal schooling and gender compositions for each experience category and
schooling measured continuously are in Table 7.19 It is important to note that the test for
equality of returns to experience now has a diﬀerent interpretation than before. Dividing










wY . The relative productivity of high versus low experience
workers now varies across plants, depending on the relative share of each group. The reported
p-value is for the test evaluated at the mean ratio for each experience class.
[Table 7]
The results close mimic the results from Table 4. The joint test is signiﬁcantly more
likely to reject equality of returns in Tanzania and Kenya than in Zimbabwe. The principal
source of rejection is still the return to experience. In Tanzania, the returns for gender and
schooling are estimated marginally closer, but in Kenya the reverse is true.
One of the principal reasons is that the two types of labor are estimated to be close
substitutes, in Zimbabwe, even perfect substitutes. It is interesting to note that the weight
of the more experienced workers in the production function increases with the development
level of the country, which one would expect if the technology is more advanced in richer
countries. Given that experienced workers are perfect substitutes for young workers, in
Zimbabwe, their only slightly higher relative weight 0.541
1−0.541 = 1.18 matches their only slightly
higher wages relatively well.
In the other two countries, the higher wage return to experience combined with a lower
weight of experienced workers in the production function would lead cost minimizing plants
to hire a lot more unexperienced workers. In the test, the equalizing eﬀect of a higher
19The corresponding results with discrete schooling attainment are very similar and available upon request.
29ratio of low to high experienced workers is dampened by the inverse of the elasticity of
substitution. Because both types of workers are estimated to be rather close substitutes, a
much higher ratio than observed would be required to rationalize the estimated wage eﬀects.
In sum, imperfect substitutability failed as an explanation for the rejection of equal wage
and productivity returns.
7.3 Sampling error
Up till now I have treated the average employee-characteristics per plant as known, even
though they were estimated from a subsample of workers. How sensitive are the results to
sampling of workers?20 Would the conclusions still hold if we had drawn a diﬀerent sample
of workers from each ﬁrm to calculate the average characteristics? I check the robustness of
the results using two diﬀerent approaches.
The ﬁrst method extends the approach in Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) to
continuous variables. I draw diﬀerent samples of workers from the implied universe of em-
ployees, constructed to be consistent with the estimated proportions for each characteristic.
For example, a ﬁrm with 100 employees from which 6 men and 4 women were actually sam-
pled, is assumed to have a total of 60 male and 40 female workers. From this universe of 100
workers, samples of 10 workers are drawn without replacement and the proportion of male
workers in each sample is used in new estimations. For continuous variables, schooling and
experience, I sample without replacement from the empirical distribution of the observed
sample of employees, which is scaled up to the total number of employees.
The samples are generated independently for all characteristics and plants, drawing for
each plant a hundred times the same number of workers as found in the original sample. For
plants where all employees are observed, I use the observed averages in each simulation. Using
each of the hundred simulated samples, the wage and production equation are estimated with
the limited number of characteristics as in Table 4. The top panel of Table 8 contains the
average coeﬃcient estimates and standard deviations across all simulations. The average
20For 8% of the plants I observe all employees and sampling is not an issue. On average, 30% of a plant’s
employees are interviewed, but the distribution is right skewed. For half of all plants, I observe less than
18% of its workers and for one out of ten plants, I observe less than 2% of its workforce.
30and standard deviation for the p-value of the Wald test for equality of all coeﬃcients is also
calculated, as well as the fraction of simulated samples where the p-value is below the 5%
signiﬁcance level.
[Table 8]
The original ﬁndings are virtually unchanged. In 99 of the samples, the joint test is
rejected for Tanzania, in only 59 of the Kenyan samples, and never for Zimbabwe. The
nature of the diﬀerences also remains the same. In the two poorer countries experience
and schooling are rewarded more than their contribution to output. In Zimbabwe, the
remuneration matches the productivity gain rather well and when they diﬀer, characteristics
tend to be underrewarded. The variability of the gender diﬀerentials is exacerbated in the
simulations.
The results conﬁrm the previous conclusions, but in a sense, this is not really the exercise
one would like to perform. What I veriﬁed was, assuming that the estimated averages were
the true underlying means, how robust the results are to diﬀerent possible samples of workers.
What one would like to know is what the results would be if the true means were used instead
of the estimates. The observed averages are consistent with a whole range of underlying true
means, but not all values are as likely given that we observe one estimate of the mean. For
any randomly generated number between 0 and 1, it is possible using Bayes’ law to calculate
what the probability is that it represents the true underlying proportion of male workers in
the plant, given that we observe one estimate of the average proportion from one particular
sample.
The law of large numbers tells us that the mean of any i.i.d. random variable is normally
distributed and the observed mean and standard deviation are consistent estimates of the true
mean and variance of the underlying random variable. The probability that the true mean
diﬀers from the observed mean by a certain amount is a decreasing function of the proportion
of workers that are observed. If the majority of all employees in the sample are observed,
the true proportion of male workers in that ﬁrm cannot diﬀer a lot from the observed
proportion. For discrete variables, we can calculate the exact probability for any diﬀerence.
For continuous variables, the probability of any number is zero and I calculate the probability
31the true average lies in an interval, given the observed average. As an approximation,
I draw random intervals of constant width for each characteristic.21 Assuming that the
estimator for the true average is normally distributed with the observed average as mean
and the estimated standard error over the square root of the number of workers interviewed
as standard deviation, I calculate the probability for any given interval that it contains the
true mean.
The product of the probability for each of the three characteristics is then used as weight
on the ﬁrm in the SUR estimation. Plants for which I observe all employees, 8% of the
sample, get a constant weight of one. As before, I draw 100 samples and the average
estimation results are in the bottom panel of Table 8.
The results largely mimic those in Table 4, also for this analysis. Rejection of the joint
hypothesis is still unanimous for Tanzania. Kenya and Zimbabwe are found to diﬀer less
than than in the observed sample, but rejection of the joint hypothesis is still more likely for
Kenya. The average p-value for Zimbabwe drops to only 13%, even though the hypothesis
can only be rejected at a 5% signiﬁcance level in 4 of the 100 samples, compared to 57 for
Kenya. Relative to the previous Monte Carlo simulations, the standard deviations of the
estimated coeﬃcients are higher.
7.4 Nonlinear returns
Another shortcoming of the previous analysis that was noted before its the limitation to
linear eﬀects. The small sample makes it hard to identify nonlinearities precisely, but one
certainly expects the returns to schooling and experience to be concave. An extra diﬃculty
is that in the aggregation from the individual to the plant-level, a ﬁrst order approximation
was made. In order for the quadratic and interaction terms in the returns to schooling
and experience to make it into the estimating equation, a second order approximation is
necessary.
21I use a diﬀerent width for the three characteristics, as their observed variance in the sample diﬀers a lot,
but is almost constant across countries.
32At the individual level, human capital—and hence the wage rate—evolves according to






i + λXSXiSi + η (13)
The derivation of the second order approximation to the production function—or the plant-
level wage bill—consistent with a Mincer model of human capital as in (13) is in Appendix
B. Estimation results are in Table 9. For comparison, the ﬁrst panel contains the estimation
results for the linear human capital model—λSS = λSS = λSS = 0—with a second order
approximation for the wage equation and production function. In the second panel, the full
quadratic model is estimated.
Little changes relative to the benchmark results in Table 4. The R2 for the regressions
hardly increase when quadratic terms are included. The rejection of equality of wage and
productivity eﬀects is more likely for Tanzania and Kenya than for Zimbabwe. The p-values
become a lot larger. Unfortunately, this is not because of closer estimates of wage and
productivity eﬀects, but simply because of less precise estimates. For example, the wage
return of experience is concave, as expected. The productivity eﬀect is still negative, but
convexly decreasing. The schooling results are much closer for Tanzania, but for Kenya they
are completely unrelated now. As before, the main source of diﬀerence between the countries
is in the experience eﬀects.
[Table 9]
It is impossible to attach any ﬁrm conclusions to such imprecise estimates. Nevertheless,
it is striking how similar wage and productivity eﬀects for experience are estimated for
Zimbabwe. It is also the only country for which the sign on all coeﬃcients, including the
quadratic and interaction terms, are equal in the wage equation and production function.
Evaluating the marginal returns to schooling and experience at the sample averages, gives
results that are close to the linear estimations. The average productivity eﬀect of a year of
schooling in Zimbabwe is 8.4%, while the wage eﬀect is 8.5%. In Tanzania, the two eﬀects are
-0.6% and +1.6%, while the corresponding eﬀects for Kenya are -1.8% and +6.7%. Similar
discrepancies apply to the average experience eﬀects. Enforcing linearity of the eﬀects does
not seem to be the driving force behind the rejections in the poorer countries.
337.5 Other explanations
One explanation for the diﬀerence between the wage and productivity returns of experience
is long term contracts. In Tanzania, and to a lesser extent in Kenya, older workers earn more
than their productivity warrants, while the reverse is true for younger workers. A similar
pattern was found in France, see Prez-Duarte, Crepon, and Deniau (2001). If contracts in
the economy are such that workers are paid less early in their career with higher earnings
later on, at any given time wage eﬀects might diﬀer from productivity eﬀects, if the eﬀects
are identiﬁed across ﬁrms. It remains puzzling why individual ﬁrms would stick with such
contracts. It makes ﬁrms with an older than average workforce particularly uncompetitive.
It would make more sense if these long term eﬀects were tied to tenure, but paradoxically we
ﬁnd the reverse. Workers with high tenure are paid less than their productivity warrants. It
is also puzzling why these long term contact would be important in a very poor country as
Tanzania, but not in a more advanced economy as Zimbabwe.
If the labor market does not operate as a perfect information spot market, one would
also expect to ﬁnd diﬀerences in wage and productivity eﬀects. For example, if workers are
matched with ﬁrms and bargain over the surplus over the match, we should not expect to
see the relative productivity match the relative wage perfectly. Firms will make wage oﬀers
that lie between the worker’s outside alternative (that might be very low) and the worker’s
productivity. Even in such an equilibrium, it is not obvious why workers in Tanzania and
Kenya are systematically paid more than their experience and schooling level warrants. These
characteristics are readily observable and it is hard to rationalize ﬁrms oﬀering salaries that
exceed productivity.
One explanation might be that the benchmark worker—young, uneducated women—are
paid less than their productivity warrants and that more educated or older workers do not
have higher productivity, but have a better bargaining position, bringing their salary closer
to their productivity level. All eﬀects discussed so far were always relative to the benchmark
worker. There is some evidence for this in Tanzania. Note that the constant term in the wage
equation is related to the labor input coeﬃcient in the production function. The ﬁrst order
condition for the benchmark worker gives w0 = αl
Q
L or in logarithms λ0 = lnαL + ln
Q
L. For
34Tanzania we can reject equality at a 1% signiﬁcance level, evaluated at the average or median
plant, indicating that the outside category of workers is paid less than the productivity level.
Therefore, higher wages for educated or experienced workers can be rationalized by a better
bargaining position of such workers, without any necessary productivity eﬀects.
While, it remains a puzzle why the extent to which less skilled workers have less bargaining
power is negatively correlated with the level of development of the country, at least it suggests
an alternative explanation for the inequality of wage and productivity eﬀects. It might still
be the case that labor markets in the least developed countries are working less eﬃciently
and fail to price worker characteristics properly. It might also be the case that ﬁrms in those
countries are not maximizing proﬁts or minimizing costs, because other considerations, such
as having the right government connections or access to credit, are more important for
survival. This analysis does not readily warrant such ineﬃciency interpretations.
8 Conclusions
A couple of conclusions can be drawn. First, the ability of countries to match wage premiums
with productivity contributions for a number of characteristics is an increasing function of
the level of economic development. Second, a lot of attention in the development literature
is devoted to education. Rightfully so, because the returns in higher salary and output
are important and I only capture a part of them in this analysis. It is nevertheless of
concern that the wage increases associated with more education signiﬁcantly exceed the
productivity gains they bring in the least developed countries. On the other hand, it should
be stressed that the returns to education—privately and to the employers—are highest in
the most developed country. Education is important, but the beneﬁts do not materialize
automatically. Third, a crucial part in the remuneration of workers is the trade-oﬀ between
paying workers for general experience versus ﬁrm-speciﬁc tenure. This mirrors a similar
trade-oﬀ between pre-employment education and formal training. The poorer countries tend
to reward the general skills (experience and schooling) relatively more than ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills
(tenure and training). In Zimbabwe, all wage premiums match the productivity gains that are
associated with them, and even more interestingly, the returns to ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments
35are higher than in the other countries. A richer model of human capital accumulation and
remuneration is needed to understand these relationships better.
The analysis does not provide a causal interpretation for the correlation between the level
of development and the extent to which wage diﬀerences reﬂect productivity diﬀerentials.
Still, both directions of causation are interesting. One possible interpretation is that when
labor markets work eﬃciently and characteristics are rewarded correctly at the margin, coun-
tries prosper. The reverse interpretation, that one important diﬀerence between countries
that are developing successfully and those that are being left behind is the greater eﬃciency
of their labor markets, is interesting as well. It is not necessarily the case that getting the
match between wages and productivity right is a necessary condition for successful devel-
opment of the manufacturing sector, but at the very least, it is a previously undocumented
diﬀerence between more and less developed countries.
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38Table 1: Summary statistics (1991)
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
Population 26.3m 24.3m 10.0m
% employed in industry 4.9% 7.3% 8.6%
Manufacturing workersa 126312 177738 187937
Workers in sample ﬁrmsb 19383 21090 58108
Workers in the sampleb 1018 1206 619
GDP/capita (PPP) 477 1092 2201
VA/empl. in industry (USD) 983 1705 7049
Median LP in samplec 38 100 142
Median TFP in samplec 54 100 143
Monthly wage (USD) 55.9 (58.6) 117.0 (322.2) 203.3 (261.3)
Share of GDP covered 0.31 0.17 0.26
Share of labor force covered 0.15 0.12 0.31
Number of plants 113 183 110
Workers per ﬁrm 97.3 89.8 269.8
Workers interviewed per ﬁrm 4.6 6.2 5.5
Male (%) 0.79 (0.40) 0.87 (0.34) 0.84 (0.36)
Age (years) 35.3 (10.5) 34.1 (9.4) 37.0 (10.4)
Experience (years) 16.4 (10.4) 16.1 (9.8) 19.9 (10.8)
Schooling (years) 12.4 (4.8) 11.5 (3.8) 11.0 (3.6)
Tenure (years) 7.8 (6.9) 7.9 (7.2) 10.3 (8.2)
Received training (%) 0.09 (0.29) 0.12 (0.32) 0.21 (0.41)
Family (%) 0.13 (0.38) 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.24)
Union worker (%) 0.47 (0.50) 0.35 (0.48) 0.54 (0.50)
Source: World Bank (2000) and own calculations for the sample statistics, a UNIDO
b in ﬁrst year; c relative to Kenya, see Van Biesebroeck (2002)
39Table 2: Simple Mincer wage regressions at the individual-level
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Male 0.056 0.085 0.072 -0.017 0.135 -0.007 0.071 0.185 0.028
(.042) (.043) (.042) (.036) (.032) (.035) (.067) (.054) (.064)
Exp. 0.023 0.015 0.022 0.018 0.013 0.015 0.010 0.005 0.009
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Sch. 0.068 0.044 0.062 0.060 0.032 0.051 0.049 0.022 0.042
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.007) (.006) (.007)
Obs. 1254 1254 1254 3111 2997 3111 1157 1154 1157
R2
a 0.33 0.43 0.34 0.21 0.43 0.26 0.12 0.45 0.19
(1) Time, sector, and location dummies included as controls.
(2) Time, sector, location, and occupation (11 categories) dummies.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































41Table 4: A market eﬃciency test for limited characteristics
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
Labor 0.830 0.781 0.818
(.079) (.057) (.066)
Capital 0.240 0.294 0.218
(.038) (.033) (.040)
Hours 0.510 -0.159 -0.337
(.140) (.180) (.332)
Male 0.148 0.829 0.030 1.838 -0.015 0.334
(.135) (.737) (.123) (1.11) (.214) (.454)
Experience 0.020 -0.028 0.026 -0.002 0.007 0.010
(.004) (.014) (.004) (.012) (.008) (.011)
Schooling 0.059 -0.001 0.091 0.058 0.117 0.105
(.009) (.033) (.011) (.031) (.023) (.036)
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-value)
Male (λM − φM) 0.35 0.10 0.43
Experience (λA − φA) 0.00 0.02 0.81
Schooling (λS − φS) 0.07 0.31 0.75
Joint test 0.01 0.05 0.72
Observations 316 544 210
R2 0.30 0.68 0.32 0.81 0.37 0.88
Joint estimation (SUR) of the wage equation and production function at the plant-level.
Controls include time, industry, and location dummies.
42Table 5: A market eﬃciency test for the full set of characteristics
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
Labor 0.799 0.758 0.808
(.084) (.070) (.066)
Capital 0.251 0.292 0.213
(.041) (.039) (.040)
Hours 0.653 -0.126 -0.282
(.161) (.200) (.322)
Male 0.213 1.071 0.313 2.664 -0.106 0.239
(.166) (1.03) (.193) (1.99) (.190) (.434)
Experience 0.026 -0.021 0.027 0.000 0.005 0.004
(.006) (.019) (.006) (.020) (.009) (.014)
Schooling 0.066 0.017 0.094 0.021 0.105 0.101
(.010) (.038) (.013) (.041) (.021) (.036)
Tenure -0.020 -0.005 0.005 0.009 0.016 0.017
(.008) (.026) (.009) (.026) (.012) (.018)
Received training 0.043 0.700 0.196 0.748 0.782 0.452
(.170) (.845) (.148) (.587) (.232) (.327)
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-values)
Joint test 0.13 0.21 0.79
Joint test—without male 0.05 0.15 0.90
Joint test—ﬁrm speciﬁc HC 0.59 0.63 0.62
Joint test—general HC 0.03 0.16 0.99
Joint test—learning 0.30 0.11 0.62
Joint test—over time 0.03 0.25 0.97
Observations 268 374 210
R2 0.26 0.69 0.34 0.80 0.40 0.88
Estimation as in Table 4.
43Table 6: A market eﬃciency test, limited to plants in the principal local market
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
Male -0.042 0.948 0.034 1.976 0.770 1.002
(.189) (1.13) (.152) (1.19) (.861) (1.22)
Experience 0.019 -0.034 0.023 0.009 0.013 0.033
(.008) (.021) (.006) (.013) (.015) (.020)
Schooling 0.052 -0.010 0.107 0.072 0.128 0.118
(.015) (.040) (.015) (.035) (.041) (.055)
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-value)
Male (λM − φM) 0.37 0.10 0.85
Experience (λA − φA) 0.01 0.30 0.36
Schooling (λS − φS) 0.12 0.34 0.86
Joint test 0.05 0.25 0.43
Observations 127 350 88
R2 0.18 0.73 0.20 0.84 0.30 0.87
Estimation as in Table 4, limited to the most prominent manufacturing city in the country.
44Table 7: A market eﬃciency test, with imperfect substitution by experience
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
Labor 0.824 0.786 0.818
(.081) (.058) (.066)
Capital 0.239 0.293 0.221
(.038) (.032) (.040)
Hours 0.513 -0.163 -0.374
(.141) (.184) (.335)
Male 0.242 0.629 0.035 1.923 0.045 0.368
(.141) (.637) (.124) (1.14) (.230) (.470)
Schooling 0.053 0.006 0.088 0.052 0.108 0.098
(.009) (.032) (.011) (.030) (.021) (.034)
Experience (high vs. low) 0.344 0.669 0.032
(.117) (.137) (.187)
Weight for high-experience 0.369 0.459 0.541
(.073) (.047) (.065)
Elasticity of substitution 6.541 3.035 ∞
(11.6) (1.46) –
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-values)
Male (λM − φM) 0.54 0.10 0.48
Experience (λA − φA) 0.00 0.00 0.63
Schooling (λS − φS) 0.15 0.25 0.77
Joint test 0.00 0.00 0.68
Observations 316 544 210
R2 0.28 0.68 0.31 0.81 0.37 0.88
Estimation as in Table 4, with high and low experienced workers imperfect substitutes,
see text for details.
45Table 8: Sensitivity analysis of the results using two Monte Carlo simulations
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
New samples are drawn from the implied universe of workers:
Male 0.179 0.627 0.026 1.526 -0.003 0.282
(.042) (.106) (.050) (.160) (.126) (.155)
Experience 0.016 -0.021 0.020 -0.005 0.003 0.005
(.002) (.005) (.002) (.005) (.004) (.005)
Schooling 0.048 -0.001 0.071 0.046 0.082 0.073
(.003) (.009) (.004) (.012) (.010) (.016)
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-value)
average 0.0008 (.011) 0.059 (.050) 0.600 (.237)
Proportion below 5% 0.99 0.59 0.00
New samples are drawn and weighted consistent with the observed means
for male, experience, and schooling
Male 0.327 1.523 0.037 0.650 0.033 0.293
(.024) (.054) (.048) (0.112) (.041) (.069)
Experience 0.023 -0.071 0.033 0.008 0.020 0.041
(.002) (.007) (.002) (.005) (.003) (.004)
Schooling 0.087 -0.031 0.104 0.037 0.116 0.190
(.003) (.014) (.007) (.020) (.010) (.014)
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-value)
average 0.000 (.000) 0.059 (.059) 0.133 (.067)
Proportion below 5% 1.00 0.57 0.04
In brackets are the standard deviations of the coeﬃcient estimates across simulations.
See text, Section 7.3, for details on the simulations.
46Table 9: A market eﬃciency test with nonlinear terms and second order approximations
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
Only linear eﬀects, second order approximations
Male -0.014 1.360 -0.067 2.323 0.027 0.221
(.136) (1.26) (.123) (1.61) (.224) (.431)
Experience 0.012 -0.047 0.013 -0.005 0.002 0.010
(.003) (.020) (.002) (.008) (.003) (.007)
Schooling 0.051 -0.013 0.080 0.060 0.118 0.064
(.009) (.032) (.010) (.034) (.016) (.030)
R2 0.29 0.70 0.32 0.80 0.35 0.87
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-values)
Joint test 0.01 0.09 0.16
Including quadratic and interaction eﬀects, second order approximations
Male -0.011 1.480 -0.117 2.254 -0.089 0.146
(.135) (1.31) (.113) (1.56) (.175) (.402)
Experience 0.001 -0.046 0.053 0.062 0.068 0.064
(.014) (.021) (.013) (.027) (.013) (.026)
Experience2 (× 100) -0.019 0.012 -0.153 -0.219 -0.817 -0.697
(.037) (.092) (.047) (.115) (.126) (.263)
Schooling 0.065 0.011 -0.007 0.086 0.067 0.018
(.044) (.117) (.037) (.076) (.052) (.100)
Schooling2 (× 100) -0.131 -0.138 0.353 -0.102 -0.184 -0.047
(.200) (.296) (.181) (.456) (.681) (1.10)
Experience × Schooling 0.217 0.035 0.233 -0.603 0.040 0.365
(× 100) (.132) (.361) (.190) (.349) (.226) (.485)
R2 0.30 0.70 0.34 0.80 0.39 0.87
Observations 267 491 194
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-values)
Joint test – linear terms 0.18 0.20 0.83
Joint test – all excluding male 0.31 0.24 0.69
Joint test – schooling terms 0.79 0.12 0.77
Joint test – experience terms 0.18 0.15 0.84
Estimation as in Table 4, including variance, covariance, and squared terms,
as derived in Appendix B.
47Appendices
A Market eﬃciency test with discrete characteristics
The results in Table A.1 diﬀer only from those in Table 4 by the treatment of experience and
schooling. In Table 4 both variables are measured by the average number of years attained
across all workers in the plant. In Table A.1 experience is measures as the proportion of
workers in each plant that attain more experience than the median (interviewed) worker
for the country. For schooling, I measure the proportion of workers in each plant that at
least attended secondary school, but not necessarily ﬁnished it. The results in Table A.2
diﬀer additionally from those in Table 5 by the same modiﬁcation for the tenure variable
as for experience. When discrete (dummy) variables are used for all characteristics, it is
not necessary to rely on a Taylor approximation for the plant-level production function.
Equation (7) can be estimated directly.
The main results go through, some become even stronger. Equality of wage and produc-
tivity premiums is strongly rejected in Tanzania, the least developed country in the sample.
In Kenya, the rejection of equality is more strongly than using continuous variables and in
Zimbabwe, equality can again not be rejected. Relative to the previous results, the premiums
in the wage and production equations are still similar in Zimbabwe, but not nearly as alike
as in Table 4. The inability to reject equality for Zimbabwe is partially the result of less
precisely estimated coeﬃcients. One conclusion that remains ﬁrm is that the rejection for
the two poorest countries is largely driven by the estimates for experience and to a lesser
degree by schooling.
The results in Table A.2 conﬁrm both conclusions reached from the estimation results in
Table 5. The p-value for a test for equality of all returns goes from 0.00 in Tanzania, to 0.06
in Kenya, and 0.38 in Zimbabwe. Higher standard errors in Zimbabwe are less of a factor
explaining these results. The greater tendency to conclude in favor of equal returns with
increasing level of development holds strongly for characteristics that have a clear human
capital eﬀect —experience, tenure, schooling, and training. The estimates for tenure and
training are especially supportive to conclude that the labor market in Zimbabwe rewards
workers’ skills in proportion to the return they bring to their employer.
48Table A.1: A market eﬃciency test for limited (discrete) characteristics
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
Labor 0.803 0.775 0.820
(.077) (.058) (.065)
Capital 0.242 0.296 0.215
(.035) (.033) (.040)
Hours 0.512 -0.130 -0.395
(.142) (.180) (.340)
Male 0.298 0.725 0.453 2.524 0.292 0.788
(.157) (.698) (.188) (1.48) (.300) (.654)
Experience 0.267 -0.475 0.456 -0.234 0.108 0.385
(.110) (.154) (.114) (.174) (.210) (.362)
Schooling 0.654 0.165 1.011 0.452 1.260 1.904
(.150) (.389) (.151) (.339) (.426) (.846)
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-value)
Male (λM − φM) 0.54 0.16 0.44
Experience (λA − φA) 0.00 0.00 0.44
Schooling (λS − φS) 0.22 0.11 0.44
Joint test 0.00 0.01 0.67
Observations 316 544 210
R2 0.28 0.68 0.34 0.81 0.36 0.89
49Table A.2: A market eﬃciency test for the full set of (discrete) characteristics
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
Labor 0.772 0.811 0.835
(.082) (.070) (.067)
Capital 0.260 0.292 0.232
(.041) (.039) (.040)
Hours 0.603 -0.095 0.268
(.162) (.201) (.356)
Male 0.566 1.428 0.853 2.718 -0.055 0.095
(.240) (1.37) (.303) (1.99) (.218) (.350)
Experience 0.297 -0.409 0.355 -0.187 0.270 0.424
(.146) (.230) (.147) (.249) (.265) (.401)
Schooling 0.835 0.193 0.958 0.193 2.133 2.330
(.162) (.416) (.168) (.317) (.640) (1.02)
Tenure -0.033 -0.240 0.310 0.523 0.784 1.028
(.104) (.280) (.141) (.474) (.309) (.496)
Received training -0.068 0.713 0.061 0.610 0.840 0.418
(.158) (.824) (.136) (.512) (.262) (.312)
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-values)
Joint test 0.01 0.04 0.66
Joint test—without male 0.00 0.04 0.65
Joint test—ﬁrm speciﬁc HC 0.53 0.52 0.47
Joint test—general HC 0.01 0.02 0.93
Joint test—learning 0.24 0.12 0.47
Joint test—over time 0.00 0.05 0.75
Observations 266 375 213
R2 0.26 0.69 0.34 0.80 0.45 0.88
50B Second order approximation of the production function
Following the derivation in Frazer (2001), the productivity adjusted labor aggregate for a












where the summation is over all workers in the plant. I write down the terms in a second
order Taylor expansion of this function that contain schooling. Similar terms for experience
and gender are omitted as their treatment is identical.




























































































































The same calculations can be performed for the derivatives with respect to Xi. Substituting




j SiSj = L2S









i SiXi − SX gives













L | {z }
(SiXi)
+....
To implement estimation, we need to calculate the variance and covariance of schooling and
experience by plant, as well as the average of schooling and experience squared. For gender,
rather than taking the derivatives, we use the assumptions in (4) and a term ln(1 + φM
LM
L )
to the estimation, as before. This amounts to factoring out the gender eﬀect from the f(.)
function, before taking the second order approximation of the remainder.
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